

Original Article

Bridging Aristotelian Logic and Islamic Jurisprudence: A Comparative Analytical Study of *Qiyās* and Logical Reasoning in Light of *Qiyās Al-Wāsi* ‘

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Abstract

This research examined logic and the role of Muslim scholars in establishing analogy through it, using it as a jurisprudential approach to its applications in Islamic jurisprudence. It also examined how Muslim scholars used Aristotelian logic in the buildup of the foundation of Islamic logical reasoning and the principles of jurisprudence. It took into account the concept of analogy: its application to Islamic jurisprudential reality, in all emerging jurisprudential issues or various unstated textual matters in the lives of Muslims. The research also focused on the foundations from which analogy is derived in its broad sense, explaining its characteristics that distinguish it from other sources of legislation, on the one hand, and from logic, on the other. It also highlighted the role of Muslim scholars, such as Imam al-Ghazali and others, in establishing analogy from logic, as well as establishing a theory for deriving rulings on new developments in Muslim reality that are not explicitly stated, to be valid for all times and places. The research followed an inductive approach, collecting, evaluating, and comparing information, then analyzing and interpreting it to arrive at its intended conclusion. The study of the issue of the relationship between logic and analogy relies on the inductive approach. The collected evidence and the opinions upon which it is based are then analyzed using the analytical approach. Using the comparative approach, it draws a comparison between the issues of logic and its relationship to analogy, before explaining the role of Muslim scholars in establishing analogy through it, and the way it is employed and applied in Islamic law.

Keywords: Aristotelian Logic; Formal Syllogism; Jurisprudence Analogy, Maqāṣid al-Shari’ah; Qiyās al-Wāsi’.

Introduction

Aristotelian logic is most of the time seen as the bedrock of formal logic and reasoning in both Western and Islamic intellectual institutions. It plays a crucial role in how inference and syllogism are used. It is based on the theory of the categorical syllogism, which holds the view that conclusions must be derived from premises. This concept laid the framework for fields like law, philosophy, theology, and jurisprudence. Muslim scholars (*mujtahidūn*), especially during the classical period, greatly participated in the study of Aristotelian logic and in integrating its structures into building the foundation of Islamic legal reasoning (*fiqh*) and the principles of jurisprudence (*uṣūl al-Fiqh*). It is essential to note that understanding this foundation is particularly important when examining the link between analogy (*qiyās*) and legal reasoning (*ijtihad*) in the context of Islamic law.

The relationship between logic and analogy is like the relationship between a tree and its roots. There is no dispute that the origin of analogy stems from logic, which is one of the rational sciences and whose subject is the search for general rules of reasoning, in terms of establishing general rules for deducing the particulars of the issues that fall under them, in order to arrive at a well-established



deductive and inferential analogical process. Some have called it the “science of balance,” because it is used to weigh ideas. The concern of this field of logic is to research the balance of judgments. Therefore, *al-Ghazālī* called all logic “the science of balance,” and the balance is an internal or external sign or textual indication that clarifies the meanings of things. Al-Ghazālī also used the word “balance” in his book *al-Wasūm bi-Mizān al-‘Amal*, with the intention of moderation for the Sufi method ¹. Its rules are servants to all sciences, whether knowledge of revelation, the sciences of jurisprudence and the principles of jurisprudence, the humanities, or the experimental sciences. Therefore, some called it the “head of sciences.” This name was given to the science of logic because of the dependence of the rest of the sciences on it and its dominance over them. Others called it the “standard of sciences” ².

Because the science of logic, in relation to others, is originally a science that belongs to the rest of the standard mechanical sciences, such as the principles of jurisprudence and its rules, grammar, and prosody. It flows into all sciences, whether knowledge of revelation or the humanities, experimental or religious sciences of jurisprudence and its principles. From here we find the concept of the “philosophical cause,” which is in the sense of searching for the reason for the existence of the universe and its orderly and systematic order, and then attempting to uncover its Creator. This is the concept and idea of the philosophical cause, i.e., among philosophers and in the science of philosophy. This causal idea in philosophy is the concept employed by legal and religious scholars regarding the branches of jurisprudence and their issues, where they term it the “cause of the ruling” as a means of uncovering the causes, meanings, and rulings, thereby arriving at a syllogistic process that facilitates the derivation of rulings based on the branches and their origins, or, in another sense, the particular and the general. From here, the four types of syllogistic reasoning were established, based on the origin (the original case issue), the branch (the new case issue), the cause (that links the new case to the original through a shared effect), and the ruling of the origin (the legal ruling). The rules of syllogistic reasoning were established to regulate such rational thinking and were termed a legal instrument, the observance of which protects the mind from error in reasoning, because it is a form of deduction and demonstration taken and developed from the rules of logic.

Literature Review

Imran Ahsan Khan ³, in his book “Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence”, written in English under the heading *al-Qiyās*, attempted to explain the relationship between interest and cause, and the broad scope of analogy based on the interest and purpose of the ruling. He gave the example of the prohibition of alcohol, explaining that the reason for its prohibition is divided into two levels: the apparent or direct reason (lower order), which is intoxication—that is, the loss of reason and consciousness—and the higher order, which is the preservation of reason. We note that his discussion leans more toward the purpose of the reason (preserving reason) than toward the apparent reason (intoxication), indicating the expansion of analogy based on necessary purposes and interests, especially in cases where there is no explicit text regarding new developments.

Sbalabi ⁴ in his dissertation for professorship, “Explanation of Rulings: A Presentation and Analysis of the Method of Explaining and Its Development in the Eras of *Ijtihād* and *Taqīd*”, addressed the explanation of rulings and analyzed the development of this method in the eras of *ijtihād* and *taqlīd*. He also discussed the possibility of explaining rulings based on wisdom and explained the origin of scholarly disagreement on this matter, especially among the scholars of the principles of jurisprudence. The most prominent findings of this study are as follows:

The possibility of explaining rulings based on wisdom and apparent descriptions, and that the description, i.e., the cause and what is similar to it, is linked to the legal ruling, and that the cause is transitive. He also explained that the cause can be explicitly stated or implicitly stated. The explicitly stated cause is the domain of *ijtihād* in the legal texts, while the implicit cause is also the domain of

¹ Al-Daihani, M., Che Abdullah, A. S., & Madun, A. (2023). Waqf Institutions in Kuwait: Historical Perspective. *Jurnal Syariah*, 30(1), 100–122. <https://doi.org/10.22452/syariah.vol30no1.4>

² Sofuoğlu, H. & Iskandar, I. (2025). Constructing legal reasoning: A historical assessment of fatwa literature from the 4th to 19th century. *Jurnal Fiqh*, 22(2), 262–292. <https://doi.org/10.22452/fiqh.vol22no2.3>

³ Fuad, M. (2025). Integration of Islamic Jurisprudence Principles within the UN Global Human Security Framework. *Khazanah Hukum*, 6(3), 1–15. <https://doi.org/10.15575/kh.v6i3.40205>

⁴ Sofuoğlu, H. & Iskandar, I. (2025). Constructing Legal Reasoning: A Historical Assessment of Fatwa Literature from the 4th to 19th Century. *Jurnal Fiqh*, 22(2), 262–292. <https://doi.org/10.22452/fiqh.vol22no2.3>



ijtihad in the legal texts, whereas the non-statutory cause is within the scope of the objectives of the *Shari'ah*.

Therefore, the researcher will rely on this study to establish the topic of the presented research, especially with regard to the logical thought that is the focus and basis of the study.

Method

The study of the relationship between logic and analogy relies on the inductive approach, collecting relevant literature on this topic from the writings of both ancient and contemporary scholars, as well as related scientific materials. This is used to deduce issues of analogy and logic. The inductive data prepare the study of the issue, together with related non-Arabic works, to examine the subject of analogy among jurists on the one hand, and the relationship between logic and analogy on the other. The analytical approach is then employed to examine the collected evidence and the opinions based on it. Finally, the comparative approach is applied to draw a comparison between issues of logic and their relationship to analogy, before explaining the role of Muslim scholars in establishing analogy through logic, and the ways in which it is employed and applied in Islamic law.

Results and Discussions

Historical Background: The Role Of Muslim Scholars In Establishing And Regulating Analogy : Imam Al-Ghazali As A Case Study

Philosophy is man's reflection on the happenings of the universe, and logic was developed or established in order to regulate thinking. It was therefore called the “servant of the sciences” by Ibn Sīnā. Logical thinking, then, existed in man's mental nature before the codification of its principles and the invention of its art. Professor Mustafa Tabatabaei wrote in his book “Muslim Thinkers Confronting Greek Logic” that Socrates thought the realization of the truth of things was possible only through the human intellect, by defining the meanings of words, whose tool is induction (*istiqra'*). Thus, it becomes clear that Socrates, for the first time, spoke about universal truth or definition in terms of what we call today induction. Socrates focused on two subjects: major, minor, and middle terms (*ḥudūd*), and definitions (*ta'arīf*), as well as induction. This contributed to the development of ancient logic, i.e., Aristotelian logic. Subsequently, Aristotle formalized rules of logic to make it a legal instrument (*āla qānūniyya*), i.e., organ, which in Greek means “instrument.”

Aristotle did not name his book *Logica*; that was done by his pupil Alexander of Aphrodisias. Aristotle divided his book *Analytica* into six chapters: propositions or statements, categories, first analytics or syllogism, second analytics or demonstration, dialectic, and fallacies or sophistry. This division reflects his view that logic is the work of thought, which comprises three components: conception (*taṣannur*), judgment (*taṣdīq*)—that is, conceiving the relation between two terms, named a proposition (*ḥukm*)—and inference (*istidlāl*)—that is, the judgment through syllogism (*qiyās*). Accordingly, he divided the first book into conceptions, argumentation, and syllogisms⁵.

As for Muslim scholars' contributions, Imām *al-Ghazālī* applied the rules of the first figure premises based on the logic method in his book *Mī'yār al-'Ulūm*, with exemplary illustration. *Al-Ghazālī* applied the same principle logically to *uṣūl al-fiqh* by employing examples of the rules of the first figure premises borrowed from the methodology of logic in his work *Mī'yār al-'Ulūm*, which merges the principles of logic and *uṣūl* for inference and derivation. *Al-Ghazālī* wrote: “If a person asks us for examples of the fourth measures mode (*al-Muqāyīs al-arba'at 'ashara*) of jurisprudence, we answer in the affirmative,” and then provided examples of the first figure.

- All drugs are wine—and all wine is illegal—so all drugs are illegal.
- All drugs are wine—and no wine is permitted—so no drug is permitted.
- Some drinks are wine—and all wine is illegal—so some drinks are illegal.
- Some drinks are wine—and no wine is permitted—so not all drinks are permitted

These are known as the four figures, and from that point on, it is evident that the jurists benefited from logic in defining legal judgments, particularly in the chapter of analogy (*qiyās*). *Al-Ghazālī* reached this point with the necessities of constructing the first figure, that is, the minor

⁵ Ihasan, I. (2018). Karakteristik Pemikiran Usul al-Fiqh Imam Al-Ghazali dalam Kitab Al-Mustaṣfa min 'Ilm al-Uṣul. *Jurnal Keislaman*, 1(1), 111–132. <https://doi.org/10.54298/jk.v1i1.3355>



premise must be affirmative (*muğibah*), i.e., a condition of quality (*kayf*), and the major premise must be universal (*kulliyah*), i.e., a condition of quantity (kamm) or both universality and particularity (*kulliyah wa juz'iyah*), as both adjectives “all” and “some” had already been used twice. Every figure has its own cases; for example, in the first figure, if both minor and major premises are universal affirmative, the conclusion will be universal; if either is particular, the conclusion will be particular; and if either is negative, the conclusion will be negative. The rule of logic states that there is no inference from two negatives, nor from two particulars. Thus, whoever does not understand logic will not understand *uṣūl al-fiqh*, nor be proficient in analogy and reasoning, since the majority of its chapters are of a logical nature and employ terminologies of logic, including the major and minor premises, and the analogical result.

However, *Imām al-Ghazālī* combined the two branches of *uṣūl al-fiqh*, deriving names familiar to Muslim scholars as an alternative to Greek terminology. Unlike *Ibn Ḥazm*, *Imām al-Ghazālī* did not reject Islamic analogy; on the contrary, he considered it to be subsumed under logical analogy. *Al-Ghazālī* never rejected *uṣūl al-fiqh* analogy, as some of his opponents claim. Rather, he reduced logical analogies to what are known as being based on the five Qur'anic scales: equivalence, the scale of concomitance and contradiction, and the first scale, which includes branches of major and minor premises and serves as a gateway to conflict and preference in *uṣūl al-fiqh*. Therefore, it is difficult to grasp *uṣūl al-fiqh* without understanding logic. *Imām al-Ghazālī* called syllogism “proof,” and defined it as a set of specific statements that necessitate what the observer desires through contemplation and comparative analytical study.⁶

Al-Ghazālī authored books on logic, including *The Criterion of Knowledge*, *The Touchstone of Reasoning*, and *al-Mustaṣfā min 'Ilm al-Uṣūl*. He established its mechanism, including syllogism, which is the essence of Aristotelian logical theory in the knowledge and sciences of revelation, the most important of which is the principles of jurisprudence. He did this through the following steps: extracting the principles of syllogism and its premises from the Holy Qur'an, expressing some Qur'anic verses through logical syllogisms—for example, The Almighty says: “My Lord is the One Who gives life and brings death,” he said: “I give life and I bring death.” Said Ibrāhīm: “Allah brings the sun out from the East; now, you bring it out from the West.” Here, baffled was the one who disbelieved, and Allah does not bring the wrongdoers to the right path. He derived the categorical syllogism of the first form from the first type, which he called the “greater balance,” and the elements of the syllogistic structure of the previous verse are as follows: Everyone who is able to see the sun is a god, and my god is the one who is able to see it. Therefore, my god is the god, not Nimrod.⁷

Based on the above, it is clear that *al-Ghazālī* did not prioritize logical syllogism over *uṣūlī* as claimed by some contemporary researchers.⁸ Perhaps the reason for this misunderstanding is that *al-Ghazālī* utilized logic to refine analogical reasoning, then reconsidered the structure based on its four pillars, namely: the original case (*al-Aṣl*), the new case (*al-Far'*), the cause of the ruling (*'illah al-Ḥukm*), and the legal ruling (*al-Ḥukm*), by returning it to the patterns of logical reasoning and transforming the ruling of the original case (*al-Aṣl*) into a universal proposition, which becomes the major premise of the logical reasoning.⁹

Modifying the ruling of the origin is done by reducing some of its attributes from the level of consideration so that the ruling expands. This increases the generality of the described, which is a feature of broad reasoning, from which we benefit by observing *Imām al-Ghazālī's* role in establishing extensive analogical reasoning. An example of the aforementioned jurisprudential and rational reasoning cited by *Imām al-Ghazālī* is as follows: Wine is forbidden by analogy to alcohol, and the reason for the prohibition of alcohol is intoxication, which serves as the basis of reasoning. Accordingly, this transforms the original ruling into a general ruling or proposition, namely, “Every intoxicant is forbidden,” so that we obtain analogy as follows: “Every intoxicant is forbidden, and

⁶ Luminkewas, C. S., Sulastri, L., Nurjaman, K., Martanto, & Dermawan, W. (2023). Sustainable Investments: A New Model for Post-Pandemic Economic Recovery. *ENDLESS: International Journal of Future Studies*, 6(3), 371–389. <https://doi.org/10.54783/endlessjournal.v6i3.232>

⁷ Arfan, A. (2014). Peran dan Pengaruh Filsafat dan Logika dalam Metode Istinbāth Hukum Islam. *Ulumuna: Journal of Islamic Studies*, 19(1), 1252. <https://doi.org/10.20414/ujis.v19i1.1252>

⁸ Kenzhegulova, G. K. (2024). The Impact of Economic Growth on Sustainable Development: An Analysis of ESG Indicators. *Eurasian Journal of Economic and Business Studies*, 68(4), <https://doi.org/10.20543/ujis.v19i1.1292>

⁹ Günther, S. (2025). *Al-Ghazālī on logic as a means of learning: Historical evidence and educational implications*. *Al-Abhath*, 73, 1–45. <https://doi.org/10.1163/2589997X-00730101>



wine is intoxicating; therefore, wine is forbidden.¹⁰⁷ *Imam al-Ghazali* also expanded the scope of analogy to a broader concept through expanded analogy and enhanced control of causal thought, known today among modern Muslim jurists as *qiyās al-Wāsi'*, which is considered even to be predominant over formal analogy (*al-Qiyās al-Shakli / al-Qiyās al-Mantiqi*) in Islamic jurisprudence, as will be discussed later ¹¹.

In conclusion, *Imam al-Ghazali* divided analogy in general into three types:

Predicate analogy, in which he mentioned three forms of predicate analogy. If the premises are conjectural, it is called jurisprudential analogy; if they are axiomatic, it is called dialectical; but if it is definitive, it is a proof, or an argument in the language of the jurists. He gave an example of this in jurisprudence as follows: “Every wine is intoxicating, and every intoxicant is forbidden; therefore, wine is forbidden.” He commented on such logical analogy and its relationship to jurisprudential analogy, saying: “The custom of jurists in such systems is that they say, ‘Wine is intoxicating, so it was forbidden by analogy to wine.’ This does not stop the claim unless it is referred to the system we mentioned. Calling this an analogy is permissible, because its result is to include a particular under a generality”. It is only a matter of choosing terms in the statement; otherwise, the essence remains the same in jurisprudence and logic.¹² The type of correlational process, which is called conditional analogy by logicians in general. A type in which *al-Ghazali* confirms that the evidence goes back to what was mentioned: “What tongues utter in the context of evidence goes back to what was mentioned. If it does not go back to it, it is not evidence; and when it is mentioned not according to this system, its cause is either the deficiency of the examiner's knowledge or his neglect of one of the two premises due to its clarity, and this is common in jurisprudence to avoid prolixity” ¹³.

Conceptual Understanding Of The Terms Jurisprudential And Logical Analogy

What is meant by jurisprudential and logical analogy is the analogy that goes back to the equality and assessment between the branch (i.e., the new issue) and the root (i.e., the legal ruling or evidence). In another sense, it is the analogy of similarities based on semantics, and language bears witness to it. By logical analogy, we mean formal analogy, in which language does not bear witness. In the terminology of logicians, it is analogy, but not in the terminology of jurisprudence. As for formal analogy, according to logicians, it is a statement composed of two premises which, if accepted, are intrinsically necessary. This is what jurists call analogy. In this section, the attempt is to study analogy in the terminology and language of logicians, its types, and its relationship to induction. Then, it is compared practically and very briefly with jurisprudential analogy, for the sake of clarity only. As for analogy based on causal reasoning (‘illah-based causal analogy), its concept, conditions, pillars, and types are presented in a special section as an introduction to expanded analogy. Expanded analogy is based primarily on the principles of causal analogy derived from *maqāṣid*, which will be discussed at the end.

Applications Of Jurisprudential Analogy (Qiyās Al-Shabah) And Logical Analogy (Qiyās Al-Tamthīl) : A Comparative Study

Jurisprudential Analogy (Qiyās al-Shabah) and Its Application

To clarify jurisprudential and logical analogy and the relationship between them, this introduction presents typical applied examples of both, beginning with jurisprudential analogy. The general definition of analogy among legal theorists is the application of a known fact to a known fact to prove or deny a ruling for both ¹⁴.

Al-Qarāfi, one of the legal theorists, defined it as: “Establishing a similar ruling for another known ruling due to a potential similarity”. This second definition, that of *al-Qarāfi*, is more

¹⁰ Wiagustini, N. L. P., Sedana, I. B. P., & Aprilia, N. P. R. (2024). Financial Sustainability Berbasis Budaya (Studi pada Lembaga Perkreditan Desa di Bali). *E-Jurnal Ekonomi & Bisnis Universitas Udayana*, 13(02), 300–310. <https://doi.org/10.24843/EEB.2024.v13.i02.p09>

¹¹ Prastowo, A. I. & Daraini, A. M. (2024). The Scientific Paradigm of Al-Ghazali and Its Contribution to Education in the Society Era 5.0. In 1st International Graduate Conference on Digital Policy and Governance Sustainability (DiGeS-Grace 2024) (pp. 1–8). SHS Web of Conferences. <https://doi.org/10.1051/shsconf/202420403008>

¹² Purnamawati, I. G. A. (2020). Sustainable Finance for Promoting Inclusive Growth. *JIA (Jurnal Ilmiah Akuntansi)*, 6(2). <https://doi.org/10.23887/jia.v6i2.39208>

¹³ Hallaq, W. B. (1990). Logic, formal arguments and formalization of arguments in Sunnī jurisprudence. *Arabica*, 37(3), 315–358. <https://doi.org/10.1163/157005890X00032>

¹⁴ Bakar, A. A. & Sahman, S. (2024). The Renewing of Usul al-Fiqh: Challenges, Limitations and Future Directions. *Indonesian Journal of Islamic Economic Law*, 1(2), 105–122. <https://doi.org/10.23917/ijoel.v1i2.5334>



appropriate for defining juristic analogy, as it includes the concepts of the pillars of jurisprudential analogy, which will be discussed at the end of this section.¹⁵

To clarify the nature of juristic analogy and its applications, we rely on its four pillars or foundations in explaining it. The pillar of a thing is its essence, from which it is inseparable, and its mutually reinforcing realities. The pillars of jurisprudential or legal analogy are four:

- The original case (al-Aṣl): The issue with a stated ruling upon which the process of analogy is applied.
- The new case (al-Far‘): The issue whose ruling is unknown and whose ruling is intended to be subordinated to the rule of the original case.
- The legal ruling (al-Ḥukm): The ruling that is the root cause and the reasoning we want to attribute to the new case.
- The cause (‘illah): This is the motive for the ruling and the unifying factor between the root (the original case) and the branch (the new case). This pillar is the most important and fundamental aspect of analogy. The cause may be explicitly stated or not, either through allusion, legal consensus, or deductive methods such as probing and division.¹⁶

Therefore, it can be said that the principle of jurisprudential analogy is a type of scientific induction based on causality. The role of legal theorists is to find solutions to newly emerging issues lacking textual evidence through analogy, given that the texts are limited and new issues arise daily.¹⁷

How did the Legal Theorists Apply the Process of Analogy to the Mentioned Analogical Pillars?

Based on the textual prohibition of alcohol, the legal theorist—the mujtahid who deduces rulings from their sources—found himself rationally inclined to identify a cause related to this prohibition. Accordingly, he began classifying the attributes of alcohol, examining them with the aim of understanding the cause of the prohibition. Among the attributes examined were color, smell, liquidity, and intoxication. He did not find any remaining quality suitable to serve as the cause of prohibition other than intoxication, due to the absence of the described quality of liquidity; otherwise, water would be forbidden. Likewise, due to the absence of yellowness as a cause of prohibition, some yellow fruits would be forbidden, and due to the absence of smell as a cause, vinegar would be forbidden¹⁸. When he tested intoxication through direct induction, he found that non-intoxicating grape juice is permissible by consensus, and when vinegar is released on its own, it is permissible. Accordingly, whenever it intoxicates, it is subject to the ruling of prohibition, and whenever it does not intoxicate, it is not subject to the ruling of prohibition. As stated in the rule: “The ruling revolves around its cause, in existence and nonexistence.” This example illustrates the process of analogy based on rational methodology and systematic reasoning in Islamic jurisprudence and its principles¹⁹.

Remark and Clarification

In jurisprudential analogy, when the ruling of the new case is mentioned in the original case in line with the shared effective cause, the type of analogy is called explicit analogy (*al-Qiyās al-Jalī*), also known as resemblance analogy or ordinary analogy. In such a case, the jurist does not need to extend the analogy and limits the process of interpretation to the actual ruling of the original case as the final ruling of the Lawgiver (*Allah*).

However, in cases where the ruling of the new case is not explicitly stated in the original case, the jurist extends the analogy beyond the mere association of the new case with the original case, based on the shared cause, but through the purpose behind the cause, called *al-Maqāṣid* (the purpose

¹⁵ Limang, A., Fonnardy, B. C., Tansil, D., Gunawan, E. K., Yadikarsa, K. I., & Asri, M. (2025). Pengaruh Growth sebagai Mediasi Antara Sustainability Report Terhadap Nilai Perusahaan. *MARAS: Jurnal Penelitian Multidisiplin*, 3(1), 257–266. <https://doi.org/10.60126/maras.v3i1.701>

¹⁶ Astarini, D., Simanjuntak, L. R., & Noor, I. N. (2024). Peningkatan Keuangan Keberlanjutan Bagi Wirausaha Muda. *Jurnal Pengabdian Kepada Masyarakat Nusantara*, 5(4), 4001–4006. <https://doi.org/10.55338/jpkmn.v5i4.3885>

¹⁷ Mohd Daud Bakar (2013). The Origins of Islamic Legal Theory (Uṣūl al-Fiqh). *Intellectual Discourse*, 5(2). <https://doi.org/10.31436/id.v5i2.395>

¹⁸ Al-Hanna'i, Z., & al-Mujahed, M. (2022). Multiple Methods of Uṣūlī Scholars to Define the Qiyās (Analogical Deduction): Causes and Effects. *International Journal of Fiqh and Usul Al-Fiqh Studies*, 6(2), 59–70. <https://doi.org/10.31436/ijfus.v6i2.266>

¹⁹ Firdaus, M. I., Daniswara, A. L., Alafianta, N. F., & Asari, A. (2023). Implementation of Fiqh Muamalah Contracts in Electronic Money (E-Money) Transactions. *Al-Muamalat: Jurnal Ekonomi Syariah*, 10(1), 13–23. <https://doi.org/10.15575/am.v10i1.21087>



of the law). This process is called expanded analogy, aiming at deriving rulings based on general welfare, called *al-Maṣlahah* (public interest), in light of the higher objectives of the *Shari'ah* (*Maqāṣid al-Shari'ah*).²⁰

In expanded analogy, causality is based on textual and linguistic indications in an attempt to determine appropriateness relative to the general principles of the *Shari'ah*, aiming to discover the inclusiveness or exclusiveness of meanings and legal objectives. However, extending the analogy through *qiyās al-Wāsi'* prevails over Aristotelian formal syllogism (*al-Qiyās al-Shaklī / al-Qiyās al-Mantiqī*), as the latter is purely a method of evidencing, deprived of consideration of the objectives of the *Shari'ah* and the textual-linguistic indications of the law, as will be clarified in the final general analysis.²¹




Figure 1: Structural-Functional Model of Islamic Jurisprudential Analogical Reasoning in the Schools of Legal Theorists

Syllogism and its Application Based on Analogical Inference (Qiyās al-Tamthīl)

Analogical syllogism, among logicians, legal theorists, and jurists, is considered similar to jurisprudential analogy due to its close resemblance to the essence and foundation of jurisprudential analogy. It represents the first type of formal analogy and is a method of direct inference. Logicians define a logical or analogical syllogism as: “A statement composed of propositions that include a statement of the participation of one part with another in the cause of the ruling, thus establishing the ruling”²². Theologians describe it as the returning of the hidden to the obvious²³. It involves transferring a specific partial ruling to another similar partial case. In essence, it is a kind of analogical inference in which a judgment is inferred from an initial instance (*aṣl*) to a novel case (*far'*) on the basis of a common attribute (i.e., causal agent, or in other words, an indicative likeness).

How do logicians apply it through its components or pillars? As observed in the process of jurisprudential analogy (*Qiyās al-Shabah*), are the two similar? The answer is as follows:

- The Claim (*al-Maṭlūb*): The ruling to be established — e.g., the possibility of life on Saturn.
- The Original Case (*al-Aṣl*): A case where the ruling is already proven — e.g., Earth is populated.

²⁰ Basthiani, I. A., & Pangestuti, I. R. D. (2024). The Role Green Economy in Sustainable Development as Long-Term Environmental and Economic Stability: A Literature. *Research Horizon*, 4(4), 187–196. <https://doi.org/10.54518/rh.4.4.2024.323>

²¹ Mutambik, I., & Almuqrin, A. (2024). The Best of Both Worlds: How Financial Growth Can Engender Improved Sustainability for Businesses. *Sustainability*, 16(11), 4821. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su16114821>

²² Sari Damayanti, A., Yunus Rusyana, A., & Anggadini, S. D. (2026). Manhaj Mutakallimin in Usul Fiqh: Theoretical Foundations for Contemporary Islamic Economic Ijtihad. *Al-Kharaj: Journal of Islamic Economic and Business*, 7(4), Article 9145. <https://doi.org/10.24256/kharaj.v7i4.9145>

²³ Rifai, R. M. (2024). Approaches to Research Methodology in Political Science: Trends and Challenges. *Jurnal Politik Internasional*, 15(2), 123–145. <https://doi.org/10.23917/jpi.v15i2.19287>



- Cause of the Ruling in the Original (*'illah al-Hukem fi al-Aṣl*): The efficient cause — e.g., availability of liquid water and a moderate environment.
- Common Attribute (*wajh al-Shabah*): A shared attribute between the aṣl (e.g., Earth has life) and the far' (e.g., Saturn has frozen water and an atmosphere).
- Conclusion (*natijat al-Tamthil*): The conclusion reached — e.g., it is probable that there may be life on Saturn.

Logicians follow certain steps in analogical reasoning, namely:

- Specifying the desired objective, or the thematic issue to be analyzed and analogized.
- Specifying the origin (the original case).
- Limiting the reason for the ruling to a point shared by the origin and the branch (the new case). This process is almost the same as that of jurisprudential analogy.²⁴

The applied example of analogical reasoning in the Hanafi school is as follows: There is a type of grape that is boiled, and it is called “*bādhiq*”²⁵.

There are four types of forbidden drinks, including wine and *bādhiq*. The ruling on wine, according to jurists, is that it is forbidden because it is a definitive ruling based on definitive texts. The common point in analogy among logicians or jurisprudential analogy among legal theorists is the cause (*'illah*). The central question in analogical reasoning is “why?” In the case of wine, for example, the mujtahid asks: “Why did the Lawgiver forbid it?” After research, we understand the cause of the prohibition and say that wine is forbidden because it is intoxicating—as explained previously in the section on juristic and logical analogy. When we find the same cause in *baadhq*, we conclude that it is like wine and therefore takes the ruling of wine²⁶. Accordingly, one reads “a part, which is wine, and another part, which is the one who spills.” Based on such a representative or horizontal analogy—and by horizontal, we mean a partial analogy to its part—in the chapter on analogy of cause or similarity, readers can clearly understand the relationship between logical and legal analogy. Here, we move from the part whose ruling is known (wine) to another part similar to it. A logical example: Wine is forbidden because it is intoxicating, and the one who spills it is intoxicating, so the one who spills it is forbidden. This is the same law in the language and methodology of legal theorists and jurists. Wine, for example, is a part and serves as the aṣl and analogy for legal theorists because it is established by the text. The word “*ḥarām*” is the ruling, and “intoxicant” is the cause of the ruling. The second part is the *baṣidh* (branch) and the syllogism.

Imam *al-Ghazālī* gives a technical example of analogical syllogism based on a general rule compared to syllogism in jurisprudence, highlighting its use in the principles of jurisprudence and in the language of its four forms. Accordingly, he states in his book *Mi'yār al-'Ilm fi al-Mantiq*: “Every intoxicant is wine, and every wine is forbidden. Therefore, every intoxicant is forbidden.” Here, wine, forbidden things, and intoxicants are the limits of the syllogism. The middle term is wine, and forbidden things are the major term. Our statement “Every wine is forbidden” is the major premise. He explains that this is a division of syllogism based on its individual parts.²⁷

The second division of this syllogism, based on its quality, places the middle term at the other two ends. This quality is called “form”. The middle term is either a predicate in one of the premises and a subject in the other, in which case it is called a form or predicate. When it appears as the middle in both premises, it is called the second form; when as the subject, it is called the third form. The result obtained is clear: the ruling on the predicate is necessarily a ruling on the subject.

In the language of representation, it moves from the ruling of the origin (wine, a part) to prove it with another part (*the baṣidh*) that has a similar element. The origin and the branch must be similar in the cause—that is, intoxication. The greatest example of this among contemporary legal theorists is the analogy of the cause of wine to drugs, where the cause may be explicit or inferred.²⁸

²⁴Lapinskiene, G. (2025). Theory and Practice of Sustainable Economic Development. *Sustainability*, 17(10), 4670. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su17104670>

²⁵Mousa, M. H. M. (2025). The Jurisprudential Regulations Extracted from Bada'i' al-Sana'i' Book, Divorce Chapter. *Dirasat: Shari'a and Law Sciences*, 52(1), 7103. <https://doi.org/10.35516/law.v52i1.7103>

²⁶Gadzhievich, M. M. (2024). The Role of Al-Hidaya by Burhanuddin al-Marghinani in the Science of Hilyaf. *Indonesian Culture and Religion Issues*, 2(1), 172. <https://doi.org/10.47134/diksima.v2i1.172>

²⁷Islam, S. M. N. & Craven, C. (2003). Making Long-Term Economic Growth More Sustainable: Evaluating the Costs and Benefits. *Ecological Economics Journal* (historic but foundational). [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0921-8009\(03\)00162-9](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0921-8009(03)00162-9)

²⁸Ateba, B. B. & Enwereji, P. C. (2024). The Resource Curse in the Gulf Region: Charting a Path for Long-Term Economic Sustainability. *International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy*, 14(5), 259–270. <https://doi.org/10.32479/ijecp.15003>






Figure 2: Structural Exemplary Illustration of Logic-Based Analogical Inference (*Qiyās al-Tamthīl*)

Formal Syllogism-Based Logical Reasoning (*al-Qiyās al-Shaklī / al-Qiyās al-Manṭiqī*)

After concluding our discussion on jurisprudential reasoning and comparing it to analogical reasoning—stating that logicians and legal jurists agree that they are almost the same in name and application—we now begin to discuss formal logical reasoning, the second type of logical reasoning. Before delving into the heart of the subject, it should be noted that logical reasoning has many types and, in essence, many formal forms. However, we will focus on the general form with a simple example for practical clarification. Logical or formal reasoning, as Abdullah Jabnakā states in his book *The Controls of Knowledge*, is “a formula... a formal method for proving facts previously known, but aspects of which were overlooked”²⁹.

Formal Syllogism (*al-Qiyās al-Shaklī / al-Qiyās al-Manṭiqī*) is formal and deductive, aiming to arrive at a judgment through a logical framework, using two premises to reach a final conclusion. This falls under the *taṣdīqāt* (affirmations) category in classical logic.

Logic generally has two methods of reasoning: indirect reasoning—which includes contradiction, inverse levels, and antithesis—and direct reasoning, which includes analogy, one of its methods and the most correct from a productive standpoint. This is followed by induction and then analogy.³⁰

Syllogism is divided into two types: conjunctive and exceptional. Conjunctive syllogism is further divided into categorical and conditional, and consists of two propositions. Logicians divide them into the first and second proposition, i.e., the higher premise and the lower premise, followed by the conclusion, which is the result of what is required to be proven for the proposition, whether by a ruling or an argument.³¹

Its formal formula consists of the minor, middle, and major terms—the recurring and the common denominator—so it is considered a formal, rational, argumentative, and deductive formula. Accordingly, it is concluded that logical reasoning attempts to demonstrate and infer propositions whose ruling is to be proven. The ruling, according to them, is the subject of belief. Therefore, Aristotle’s research method is based on demonstration and inference, and reasoning is the product of deductive reasoning, unlike fundamentalist reasoning that seeks to resolve important legal issues, whether explicitly or implicitly stated. Indeed, reasoning is part of its method, and its details and application will be discussed shortly.

In formal syllogism, several elements are foundational to its application, as follows:

- Major Premise (*al-Muqaddimah al-Kubrā*): comprises the major and middle terms.

²⁹ Harahap, A. L. & Harahap, S. (2024). Epistemologi Pengetahuan dan Kriteria Kebenaran Barat dalam Perspektif Studi Islam. *Jurnal Studi Ilmu Alquran dan Tafsir*, 2(2), 285. <https://doi.org/10.47134/jsiat.v2i2.285>

³⁰ Advances in Economics & Financial Studies. (2024). Corporate Financial Management and Sustainable Growth. *Advances in Economics & Financial Studies*, 2(2), 53–66. <https://doi.org/10.60079/aefs.v2i2.172>

³¹ Sadiq, M., Fadel, M. E., Mezher, T. et al. (2025). Interconnectedness of Economic Growth and Environmental Sustainability: Challenges and Strategies. *Energy, Sustainability and Society*, 15, 43. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s13705-025-00543-x>



- Minor Premise (*al-Muqaddimah al-Sughra*): comprises the middle and minor terms.
- Conclusion (*al-Natijah*): conjoins the minor and major terms.

An exemplary illustration is:

- Major Premise: All human beings are mortal.
- Minor Premise: *Zayd* is a human being.
- Conclusion: Therefore, *Zayd* is mortal.




Figure 3: Structural Exemplary Illustration of Formal Syllogism-Based Analogical Reasoning (*al-Qiyās al-Shaklī / al-Qiyās al-Mantiqī*)

Table 1: Logical Analogy (*al-Qiyās al-Shaklī / al-Qiyās al-Mantiqī*), Jurisprudential Analogy, and Logical Analogy’s Similarity to Islamic Tamthīl Compared

Aspect	Islamic Jurisprudence Analogy (<i>Qiyās</i>)	Logical Analogy (Similar to Islamic: <i>Tamthil</i>)	Logical Analogy (Formal Syllogism)
Purpose	To derive legal rulings for new cases based on known cases.	To explain or illustrate a concept by comparison (<i>tamthil</i>)	To reach a necessary conclusion based on premises
Basic	Root (<i>Asl</i>) Branch (<i>Far</i>) Cause ('Illah) Ruling (<i>Hukm</i>)	Source Target Shared Attribute Conclusion	Major Premise Minor Premise Conclusion
Structure	Wine (<i>Asl</i>) is prohibited due to intoxication (<i>Illah</i>). Another intoxicating drink (<i>Far</i>) prohibition (<i>Hukm</i>)	A known example is used to illustrate a similar case by analogy	All men are mortal (Major Premise). Socrates is a man (Minor Premise). Therefore, Socrates is mortal (Conclusion)
Example	Deductive analogical reasoning based on shared cause	Analogical reasoning, focusing on similarity and illustration	Deductive reasoning with formal categorical premises



Type of Reasoning	Transferring ruling based on shared effective cause (' <i>Illah</i>)	Highlighting similarity to clarify or explain	Establishing a valid conclusion by logical by necessity
Focus of Analogy	Transferring ruling based on shared effective cause (' <i>Illah</i>)	Highlighting similarity to clarify or explain	Establishing a valid conclusion by logical necessity
Key Components	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Asl (<i>Root</i>): Original case • Far (<i>Branch</i>): New case • '<i>Illah</i> (<i>Cause</i>): Reason behind ruling • Hukm (<i>Ruling</i>): Legal judgment • A legal ruling expanded from known to new case. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Source: Known example • Target: New situation • Shared attribute: Basis for comparison • Conclusion: attribute Inferred • Understanding or inference based on analogy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Major Premise: General statement. • Minor Premise: Specific case • Conclusion: Deductive result • A logically necessary conclusion.
Outcome	A legal ruling expanded from known to new case	Understanding or inference based on analogy	A logically necessary conclusion

The Relationship Of Logical Analogy And Jurisprudential Analogy To Induction

The attentive reader may wonder why the paper did not conduct an independent study of induction, as it did with logical and jurisprudential syllogisms, before comparing them in the current section. The answer lies in two reasons. First, induction is generally an integral part of syllogism, whether in jurisprudential or logical syllogisms. Second, this section focuses on comparing logical and jurisprudential syllogisms through induction, since induction is a component of both in some respects, as will be discussed.³² This sequential arrangement is logical, and the paper aims to avoid prolixity by examining only the relationship between jurisprudential and logical syllogisms through induction in the current section.³³

Defination Of Induction

Aristotle defined induction as: "A judgment about a genus based on the existence of that judgment in all its parts"³⁴. The concept of induction among jurists and legal theorists is not far from this definition. Abu Hamid *Al-Ghazali* considers it an examination of particular matters in order to judge a particular fact within a matter that includes those particulars. Accordingly, analogy involves tracing particulars to establish a general rule, i.e., tracing particulars to derive a general judgment.

³² Advances in Economics & Financial Studies. (2024). Understanding the Linkages Between Financial Markets and Sustainable Economic Development. *Advances in Economics & Financial Studies*, 2(2), 76–87. <https://doi.org/10.60079/aefs.v2i2.282>

³³ Buniarto, E. A., Umasugi, M., Musyarofah, A., Setiawan, J. & Hartoto, H. (2025). Analysis of the Long-Term Impact of Public Debt Policy on Macroeconomic Stability in Indonesia. *International Journal of Economics*, 4(1), 353–368. <https://doi.org/10.55299/ijec.v4i1.1292>

³⁴ Ahmad Rofii (2024). Kepastian epistemologi hukum Islam: Kritik al-Syāṭibī terhadap konsep qat'ī-zannī. *Al-Manahij: Jurnal Kajian Hukum Islam*, 7(1), 573. <https://doi.org/10.24090/mnh.v7i1.573>



To clarify the relationship between jurisprudential and logical syllogisms through induction, we first note that syllogisms, according to logicians, are analogies of forms and representation, as previously mentioned. Formal syllogisms are formal formulas and have approximately four forms. Representation refers to analogy among jurists and accompanies both for induction as part of their syllogism. These three methods are among the methods of direct inference³⁵. This means that we do not intercede between the premises and the conclusion, unlike indirect inference. In indirect inference, we intercede with a proposition, which is done by contradiction, inversion of levels, or inversion of the opposite.

For example, to infer a matter using the law of contradiction: we intercede with a proposition, prove it to be false, and then demonstrate that its opposite is true. We then proceed to the conclusion through a premise. However, in direct inferential syllogism, according to logicians, there are no intermediaries; the reasoning consists solely of major and minor premises, followed by a conclusion.

The common ground between fundamental and logical analogy and the process of induction is as follows. First, the scope of logical analogy includes both direct and indirect deduction, along with analogy and representation—that is, jurisprudential analogy and the induction methods of direct deduction. This is why the process of induction is sometimes called deductive deduction. Second, the process of deduction and argumentation aims to prove issues in general and to clarify the legal ruling in particular for jurists. Accordingly, *Sheikh Abdul Hadi Al-Fadli* states in his *Khulasat Al-Mantiq*: “It is necessary to study the issues before the methods of deduction, because the issues are the materials of deduction and its elements from which it is composed.”

Through the process of legal analogy, the legal theorist studies the emerging issue, i.e., the type of issue, trying to determine whether the new issue has a ruling in the original source (i.e., the text). If so, the ruling is derived from the original through the comprehensive cause. If the emerging issue has a comprehensive cause appropriate to the law of the ruling, inference is made through the process of causal analogy called the ‘controlled apparent description’, which is attached to the text. If the issue does not have a ruling in the original due to the absence of a comprehensive cause—that is, the new issue, case, or question lacks a ruling in the original—then deduction, inference, and proof are carried out through the process of expanded analogy based on the objectives of the text, which are appropriate meanings and comprehensive wisdoms. Contemporary jurists have referred to this as *mursal*, *maqāṣidi*, or *muṣalib* inference, as discussed in the chapter on expanded analogy³⁶.

The issue sought to be proven is often partial, i.e., subsidiary, according to jurists. For the maqāṣid scholars, it is the partial objectives. The evidence for the sought-after is generally general, but sometimes the opposite occurs among logicians, where the sought-after is sometimes general and the evidence for it is partial, and sometimes the sought-after is partial and the evidence for it is partial. This is the analogy of the uṣūliyyah among jurists. This reflects the generality of the relationship.

In induction, what is required is a general and broader meaning, while the evidence for it is partial and specific, unlike formal and representative analogy. Induction is an ascending proof, proceeding from the particular to the general. For jurists, it depends on examining the parts and then deriving a general proof. As *Abū Ishāq al-Shāṭibī* explains in his commentary on *Ibn Malik’s Alfiyyah*, the word can be a noun, a verb, or a particle, and the conclusive proof in the matter—limiting it to that—is induction³⁷.

We can summarize the issue as follows: the difference between formal analogy and induction is that in formal analogy, we move from a general rule to prove a partial requirement, which is a descending path, as previously illustrated. In induction, the process is the opposite. For example, by observing individual human beings, we find that one individual dies, and another individual also dies, and thus we conclude that all human beings die. Here, *Zayd* and *Amr* represent partial indications, and the general rule applies to all human beings.

³⁵ Anshori, A. Y. & Abdurrahman, L. T. (2025). History of the Development of Maḏhab, Fiqh and Uṣūl al-Fiqh: Reasoning Methodology in Islamic Law. *Samarah: Jurnal Hukum Keluarga dan Hukum Islam*, 9(1), Article 25355. <https://doi.org/10.22373/sjhk.v9i1.25355>

³⁶ Rudianto, R., Musyahid, A., & Sultan, L. (2023). Logika Maqashid: Implementasi Maqāṣid al-Sharī‘ah dalam Konteks Hukum Kontemporer. *Jurnal Tana Mana*, 6(1), 1046. <https://doi.org/10.33648/jtm.v6i1.1046>

³⁷ Kurniawan, E., Mustaniruddin, A., Rizani, A. K., Muchimah, Zaenuri, A., & Muttaqin, M. Z. (2025). Recent Studies on the Maqāṣid al-Sharī‘ah of Abū Ishāq al-Shāṭibī: A Systematic Literature Review. *AJIS: Academic Journal of Islamic Studies*, 10(1), 1–26. <https://doi.org/10.29240/ajis.v10i1.1128>



Induction involves tracing, i.e., examining each instance and its type, or in simpler terms, reviewing all details and then arriving at a general rule. There are two types of induction: complete indication, which is induction from the part to the whole, and incomplete indication, which conveys conjecture, i.e., induction from most of the details³⁸

An example of incomplete induction according to logicians is as follows: “Every animal is either a human, a donkey, or a horse. Every human moves his lower jaw when chewing, and so does every horse and every donkey. Therefore, every animal moves its lower jaw when chewing”. This reasoning is false because the minor premise is incorrect: animals are not limited to those mentioned. The statement “An animal is either a human, a horse, or a donkey only” is therefore not true.

It may be that what is not like this comes from its individuals outside of it, especially since it has been mentioned that the crocodile moves its upper jaw when chewing. Incomplete induction serves as a precaution against complete induction, because complete induction represents one of the certainties. For example, every word is either a noun, a verb, or a particle, and each of them is a single statement, as mentioned previously. Therefore, incomplete induction is a general ruling present in most of its parts. It acts as a precaution because if it were present in all parts, it would be considered complete. Complete induction is one of the certainties, and what is meant by incomplete induction is what is not included in certainties³⁹.

An example is their statement: “Everybody is localized” (i.e., occupies a place in space). This is complete induction because all bodies have been studied inductively and found to occupy a place in space. If we were to examine all parts of a body—whether animal, inanimate, or plant, regardless of species—we would find them localized. Therefore, this constitutes a direct inductive proof, and every localized body becomes a universal rule.

Syllogism, as mentioned above, is defined in the language of logic as proving a ruling in one part by proving it in another part⁴⁰. It is called horizontal syllogism because it starts from one part and moves to another part horizontally; no universal proposition enters except the established rule after the process of induction, with the intention of applying it to propositions or questions. *Sheikh Saad al-Din al-Taftazani* defined it as: “Representation is the statement of the participation of one part with another in the cause of the ruling in order to prove it from it, and the mainstay is in the method of circularity”⁴¹.

Syllogism: as mentioned above, is in the language of logic: proving a ruling in one part by proving it (the ruling) in another part. It is called horizontal syllogism because it starts from one part towards another part horizontally, and no universal proposition enters it except its established rule after the process of induction with the intention of applying it to propositions or questions. *Sheikh Saad al-Din al-Taftazani* defined it, saying: “Representation is the statement of the participation of one part with another in the cause of the ruling in order to prove it from it, and the mainstay is in the method of circularity.”

Sheikh Sayyid Husayn defined it in his book ‘Lessons in Logic’ as: “The mind’s transition from the ruling of one thing to the ruling on the other due to a common aspect between them”⁴².

³⁸ Arfan, A. (2014). Peran dan Pengaruh Filsafat dan Logika dalam Metode Istinbâth Hukum Islam. *Ulumuna: Journal of Islamic Studies*, 19(1), 1252. <https://doi.org/10.20414/ujis.v19i1.1252>

³⁹ Ithasan, I. (2018). Karakteristik Pemikiran Usul al-Fiqh Imam Al-Ghazali dalam Kitab Al-Mustaşfa min ‘Ilm al-Usul. *Jurnal Keislaman*, 1(1), 111–132. <https://doi.org/10.54298/jk.v1i1.3355>

⁴⁰ Syarif, E. (2019). Pengaruh Mantiq (Logika) dalam Pengembangan Ilmu-Ilmu Keislaman. *Ilmu Ushuluddin*, 3(2), 265–282. <https://doi.org/10.15408/iu.v5i2.10904>

⁴¹ Lubis, N. S., Farleni, F., Juansah, D. E., & Nulhakim, L. (2021). Proposisi, logika dalam berpikir sebagai dasar penalaran ilmiah dalam menghasilkan pengetahuan baru. *Jurnal Filsafat Indonesia*, 6(2), 56233. <https://doi.org/10.23887/jfi.v6i2.56233>

⁴² Firdaus, M. & Dina, S. (2023). The Existence of Philosophy and Mantiq (Logic) in the Development of Islamic Sciences in the 5.0 Era. *Jurnal Filsafat Indonesia*, 6(3). <https://doi.org/10.23887/jfi.v6i3.66027>



INDUCTIVE AND LOGIC-BASED ANALOGY IN IJTIHAD




Figure 5: Inductive and Logic-Based Analogy in Islamic Legal Interpretation in Light of *al-Maqāsid*

General Analysis In Light of Expanded Analogy (*Qiyās Maqāsid*)

Analogy in general is a legal-intellectual rule (*qānūn ‘aqli shar‘i*) that protects the mind from straying in reasoning, just as grammar protects the tongue from straying in speech. It is a tool (*ālā*) of sound reasoning that makes use of universal principles from which particular legal decisions can be inferred.⁴³

Advanced analogy based on *maqāsid* (*qiyās maqāsidī*) in Islamic jurisprudence differs somewhat from syllogistic analogy (*qiyās shaklī*) and prevails over it in terms of jurisdictional interpretation. However, it has the following features:

- Adds new ancillary questions to the universal, fundamental objectives of the *Shari‘ah* even when there is no express textual cause (*‘illah*).
- Is broader, deeper, and closer to the wisdom (*ḥikmah*) and intent (*maqṣad*) of divine legislation.⁴⁴
- Includes public interest (*maṣlahah*) and prevents harm (*mafsadah*), in harmony with the dynamic, purposive character of the *Shari‘ah*.

Qiyās al-Tamthīl (analogy by similarity) is closest to the principles of Islamic legal interpretation when derived from *maqāsid*. It is a procedure of:

- Imposing decisions from known cases upon new similar cases based on shared meanings.
- Ensuring that decisions preserve public interest and prevent harm.
- Being respectful of legal reasoning oriented toward causes, wisdom, and purposes.

Analytical Summary of Expanded Analogy (*Qiyās al-Wāsi‘*) Based on *al-Maqāsid*

Expanded Analogy (*al-Qiyās al-Wāsi‘*) is defined as establishing a connection between divine intent, fitting meanings, wisdoms (*ḥikam*), and causes (*‘ilal*), linking a new problem (*far‘ jadīd*) to a universal, obligatory purpose (*maqṣad kullī ḍarūrī*) of the Lawgiver. Alternatively, it associates an extraneous issue with one of the five *maqāsid* (preservation of religion, life, intellect, lineage, property), whose meaning aligns with Islam's genus of public interest and conforms to the spirit of the law. This approach improves upon syllogistic formal analogy in that it considers both the text and general intent (*maqṣad*) as well as public interest (*maṣlahah*).⁴⁵

⁴³ Nayak, R. L. (2025). Sustainability Practices and Corporate Performance: A Longitudinal Study of ESG Metrics. *Economic Sciences*, 21(03S), 186–193. <https://doi.org/10.69889/ftvjj285>

⁴⁴ Doloan, A. (2023). Sustainable Economic Development: A Systematic Literature Review on Global Perspectives and Strategies. *Economics Studies and Banking Journal (DEMAND)*. <https://doi.org/10.62207/8dypxz38>

⁴⁵ Basthiani, I. A. & Pangestuti, I. R. D. (2024). The Role Green Economy in Sustainable Development as Long-Term Environmental and Economic Stability: A Literature. *Research Horizon*, 4(4), 187–196. <https://doi.org/10.54518/rh.4.4.2024.323>



Illustrative Example: Narcotics and Wine

A significant model is the analogy of narcotics to wine, based on the shared cause of intoxication (*iskār*), a legislatively recognized 'illah forming a universal rule. The judicial ruling on wine extends to all intoxicants, making many specifics analogized to one familiar cause. This reflects the purpose behind preserving intellect (*hifz al-'aql*) and preventing harm, illustrating the maxim: "The ruling follows its cause, wisdom, and purpose—presence and absence."

Maqāṣid and Legal Hermeneutics in Action

Qiyās al-Tamthīl—analogy of similarity—is more flexible than formal strict logic, especially where *maqāṣid* is its directive. It enables jurists to extend rulings to new circumstances even when there is no clear textual analogy, provided that the rulings promote known universal purposes. For example, Abū Bakr's collection of the Qur'an lacked an explicit analogical cause but was based on the intention of protecting religion (*hifz al-Dīn*), showing the application of unrestricted analogy where there is no explicit 'illah but purpose and benefit are involved.⁴⁶

Dynamic and Purpose-Oriented Legal Reasoning

Analogy is not a rigid logical formality but a dynamic, principled method that integrates causes, wisdoms, and purposes to assure the *Shari'ah's* integrity under changing circumstances. With free, *maqāṣid*-grounded analogy, Islamic legal reasoning achieves both fidelity to revelation and adaptability to new realities.⁴⁷

The Relation of Particulars to Universals in Logic (Aristotle's Contribution)

Aristotle established a causality-based system to perform wide analogical inference (*qiyās wāsi'*) for legal judgments by derivation. Deductive argument begins with the identification of categories (universals), among which relations facilitate logical assertions and sound inferences.⁴⁸ Default models of categorical statements in Aristotelian logic⁴⁹: this universals particulars are truly universal as they are analogically suitable in law of derivation while dealing literally through linguistic indication meanings, are as follows:

- Universal Affirmative (A) : All S are P. Example: All politicians are liars.
- Universal Negative (E): No S is P. Example: No politician is a liar.
- Particular Affirmative (I): Some S are P. Example: Some politicians are liars.
- Particular Negative (O) : Some S are not P. Example: Some politicians are not liars.

Similarly, Muslim jurists employed reasoning and analogical argument in *fiqh* and *uṣūl*, classifying deductive conclusions based on the spirit and semantics of Arabic—the language of the Qur'an—and thus separating exceptions from general rulings, negations from affirmations, specifiers from universals, particulars from universals, and branches from roots, all within the legal, semantic, and *maqāṣidic* framework of revelation, employing deductive *qiyās*. In *al-Qiyās al-Wāsi'*, specific purposes are matched against higher *Shari'ah* purposes by meanings and sages, through a general meaning-based inductive procedure. Analogues not excluded or indicated belong to the general *maqāṣid* meanings, and the general rule governs all its occurrences.⁵⁰

For *maṣlaḥah mursalah*, it is not proof on its own but must be coupled with other proofs, since in *al-qiyās al-Wāsi'* the 'illah of affirmation is the proof, and its relation to meaning depends on correct meanings and *Shar'i* rules derived from evidence and *uṣūl* regulations. In expanded analogy (*al-Qiyās al-Wāsi'*), induction (*istiqrā'*) is used to conclude a general rule after verifying individual instances and proving the presence of the rule in them. This general rule then applies by necessity to all included cases—like applying the ban on intoxicants to all their kinds. Above all, the argument and the conclusion are correlatively related by reason, based on the type of meaning that is common between the first case and the novel one, in virtue of its *Shari'ah* rule.

⁴⁶ Basthiani, I. A. & Pangestuti, I. R. D. (2024). The Role Green Economy in Sustainable Development as Long-Term Environmental and Economic Stability: A Literature. *Research Horizon*, 4(4), 187–196. <https://doi.org/10.54518/rh.4.4.2024.323>

⁴⁷ Nayak, R. L. (2025). Sustainability Practices and Corporate Performance: A Longitudinal Study of ESG Metrics. *Economic Sciences*, 21(03S), 186–193. <https://doi.org/10.69889/ftyj285>.

⁴⁸ Klumpp, M. & Loske, D. (2021). Long-Term Economic Sustainability of Humanitarian Logistics — A Multi-Level and Time-Series Data Envelopment Analysis. *International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health*, 18(5), 2219. <https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph18052219>

⁴⁹ Lubis, N. S., Farleni, F., Juansah, D. E., & Nulhakim, L. (2021). Proposisi, logika dalam berpikir sebagai dasar penalaran ilmiah dalam menghasilkan pengetahuan baru. *Jurnal Filsafat Indonesia*, 6(2), 56233. <https://doi.org/10.23887/jfi.v6i2.56233>

⁵⁰ Horodecka, A. (2024). Is Economic Development Really Becoming Sustainable? A Triple Bottom Line Approach. *Resources*, 11(5), 46. <https://doi.org/10.3390/resources11050046>



Passage from the former to the latter is subject to inter-descriptions and meanings—i.e., both possess a common attribute.⁵¹

Conclusion

This research concluded that syllogism in logic represents the rational framework regulating the process of reasoning, while syllogism in the principles of jurisprudence (*uṣūl al-Fiqh*) is a methodological tool for deriving Islamic rulings. Scholars—such as Imām *al-Ghazālī* and others—successfully established a solid intellectual system linking logical syllogism and jurisprudential syllogism by utilizing Aristotelian logical methods and adapting them to serve the principles of jurisprudence. We can equally deduce from this research that jurisprudential syllogism, particularly syllogisms of cause and effect, benefited from the methodology of logical representation, which helped regulate the process of *ijtihād* (inference-based reasoning) and achieve consistency between the overall objectives of Islamic law and changing realities. Furthermore, broad syllogism is the result of a natural evolution of jurisprudential syllogism, combining the spirit of *ijtihād* with rational principles and ensuring the validity of Islamic law for all times and places.

After the comparative analysis of the standard applications in logic and the principles of Islamic jurisprudence, this research has reached several points, which deem it highly important to suggest the following recommendations. There should be an in-depth study of the relationship between logic and the principles of jurisprudence in academic programs, particularly in faculties of *Shari'ah* and philosophy. This will contribute to the development of a deductive mindset capable of linking rational and transmitted knowledge. We should return to the study of the heritage of legal principles and logic through comparative analytical approaches, and adopt the tools of modern philosophical and logical research to develop systems of *ijtihād* in light of the rapid changes in Muslim lives. Encourage applied comparative research between logical reasoning in its various forms (representational and formal) and jurisprudential reasoning with its pillars and fields, using realistic cases and contemporary fatwas, particularly in issues of financial transactions, Sharia policy, and contemporary medicine.

Expand the application of broad and objective reasoning while ensuring its regulation by precise legal reasons and strict legal principles, to ensure that the texts are not altered and that the interests of those concerned are achieved in light of the objectives of *Shari'ah*. Emphasize the role of Imam *al-Ghazālī* and other pioneers of methodological foundations in linking logic and the principles of jurisprudence by re-teaching their major works on logic and *uṣūl*, such as *al-Mustasfa* and *Mi'yār al-'Ilm*, as solid scientific models for understanding the truth of Islamic reasoning.⁵² Propose an integrated foundational project that combines the syllogistic approach and deductive logic in the form of a curriculum or methodological encyclopedia, serving contemporary researchers, muftis, and mujtahids, and unifying the tools of jurisprudential reasoning based on reason and transmitted texts. Integrate the tools of jurisprudential, logical, and inductive reasoning when addressing emerging issues, thus establishing the “complex reasoning” approach in jurisprudential reasoning and helping to produce methodological visions capable of generating valid *Shari'a* rulings for contemporary developments. Utilize contemporary trends in the philosophy of science and mathematical logic to enhance the tools of *ijtihād* without compromising the principles of *Shari'ah*, so that legal analogy becomes a flexible framework capable of developing in line with the constants of the scripture and the contemporary spirit.

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⁵² Ghalib, H. A. & Saleh, M. Y. (2025). Sustainable Business Practices: A Conceptual Framework for Long-Term Growth. *International Journal of Integrative Research*, 3(3), 451. <https://doi.org/10.59890/ijir.v3i3.451>



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